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Abstract: Business research and development (R&D) expenditures in the UK is low by international 
standards. To encourage investment, the UK government has been providing both direct and indirect 
support. The aim of this paper is to address four inter-related and policy-relevant questions: (i) what do 
we know about the UK regime for direct grant schemes? (ii) is the UK subsidy complementary or 
substitute for privately-funded R&D? (iii) does the UK funding regime differ from the EU regime in 
terms of selection and effect? (iv) does the scope for complementarity/additionality differ between 
different rates of funding? We address these questions using a rich dataset for more than 44 thousand 
UK firms from 1998-2012; and a range of treatment-effect estimators with and without control for 
selection. We report that the EU selection regime is more likely to support firms with long-term R&D 
plans. In addition, the UK subsidy is not associated with additionality, but the EU subsidy is. Finally, 
leverage estimations indicate that targeting a particular rate of subsidy is not likely to make a difference 
to private R&D effort in the UK subsidy case; but an increase in EU subsidy intensity does create 
leverage among firms that fall between the median and 75th percentile of the subsidy intensity 
distribution.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Public support for business R&D is usually justified on the basis of market failures (Arrow, 
1962; 1996). Due to some public good characteristics, knowledge produced by a firm can 
spillover to other firms and deter the investor from undertaking the optimal level of R&D 
investment. In addition, information may be characterized by increasing returns to scale, 
conducive to very low marginal costs relative to average cost. For welfare maximisation, this 
property may require free provision of information but poses the serious issue of incentive 
compatibility in the production of information. Finally, R&D investment is associated with a 
high degree of uncertainty - not only with respect to success in generating new knowledge but 
also with respect to using the new knowledge in the production of new goods and services. For 
these reasons, governments have devised various schemes to provide direct and indirect support 
for R&D investments. The UK government has used such measures with approximately equal 
intensities, but “the business enterprise component of R&D expenditure in the UK” has 
remained low by international standards – “even after adjusting for structural difference 
between countries.” (Hughes and Mina, 2012).  
This is not surprising because the case for supporting R&D activities is not as 
straightforward as the neoclassical case summarised above. From an evolutionary perspective, 
knowledge cannot be absorbed unless imitating firms invest in R&D in the first place (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1989). If this is the case, public support may lead to excess investment. Excess 
R&D investment can also occur when firms engage in ‘patent races’, which lead to higher-
than-optimum levels of R&D investment (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Dasgupta, 1988; and 
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). Finally, the public good character of R&D may be 
overstated. A firm can use a wide range of tools to protect its inventions, including patents and 
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secrecy (Nadiri, 1993). Therefore, the case for supporting R&D activities may be less 
straightforward than it might appear in the first instance. 
These theoretical perspectives imply that direct public support for business R&D may 
or may not be effective in inducing firms either to undertake the optimal level of R&D 
investment or to create additionality on top of the public subsidy. Because of this ambiguity, a 
large volume of empirical work has been undertaken to find out how various public support 
schemes have affected firm behaviour with respect to R&D effort. A number of reviews of this 
literature exists. While Hall and Van Reenen (2000) review the literature on indirect support 
schemes such as tax incentives, David, Hall and Toole (2000) review the literature on direct 
support schemes. More recently, Cerulli (2010) provides a review of the models and estimators 
widely used in the empirical literature.  
The aim of this study is to add to existing knowledge in three areas. First, we provide 
evidence on UK firms with a view to bridge the evidence gap on a country that have well-
established direct and indirect support mechanisms for business R&D. In 2009, the UK 
occupied the top 8th place among OECD countries ranked on the basis of direct and indirect 
support for business R&D as a percentage of GDP. This is lower than the United States (US) 
at the 5th place, but above Sweden, Norway and Germany at the 11th, 13th and 18th places, 
respectively. Yet, and to the best of our knowledge, there has been no study investigating the 
consequences of UK support schemes for input additionality.1  
Secondly, we control for selection in line with the existing literature, but we contribute 
to existing work by providing novel evidence based on a conditional mean approach that 
corrects for firm-specific effects in both the selection and outcome models.  
Third, we go beyond the current practice and demonstrate how the relationship between 
subsidy and the R&D effort differs between firms when the latters are divided into latent classes 
                                                          
1 We have identified only one study – a Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) analysis paper on output 
additionality (BIS, 2014). The only study on input additionality was Buxton (1975), based on industry data. 
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based on subsidy intensity (subsidy/privately-funded R&D).  This ordered-Heckman-type 
estimation allows for identifying the subsidy intensity levels (classes) where input additionality 
is relatively more (less) substantial.  
To achieve these aims, the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
review of the relevant literature, including meta-analysis findings on the balance of evidence 
in the research field. Section 3 introduces the key elements of the UK and EU funding regimes 
and the dataset used. The upshot of section 3 is that the rich dataset should be interrogated with 
appropriate treatment-effect methods that take account of both observable and unobservable 
factors that affect selection into funding. Hence section 4 is devoted to a discussion of the 
relevant methods, which are informed by structural modelling of R&D effort augmented with 
selection on observables and un-observables.  We offer two novelties in section 4: (i) exploiting 
panel-data techniques to take account of firm-specific fixed effects in both selection and 
outcome models; and (ii) using an ordered-Heckman estimator to identify the rates of funding 
at which the scope for additionality is higher (lower). Section 5 provides a range of findings, 
indicating that the UK regime is not effective in generating additionality whereas the EU 
regime is. We discuss the difference in the light of observable and unobservable differences 
between the UK and EU regimes. Finally, section 6 offers a number of conclusions that call for 
careful policy design and less sanguine assumptions about the case for public support of R&D 
investment. 
 
2. A brief review of the empirical literature 
 
Following the pioneering work by Blank and Stigler (1957), a large body of empirical work 
has utilised a variety of datasets and different estimation methods to ascertain whether public 
and private R&D investments are complements or substitutes. The literature has evolved over 
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time, starting with estimations of structural models without control for selection, going through 
structural models with selection and finally the emergence of matching estimators based on 
propensity scores (Cerulli, 2010).  
David et al. (2000) is an early review of the literature on direct public support schemes 
and private R&D effort. Given the time of publication, this review focuses mainly on studies 
that used structural models without control for selection. Out of 14 firm-level studies reviewed, 
only 4 used a selection equation or some instrumental variable (IV) estimator. In terms of 
findings, 3 studies report complementarity (additionality), 5 studies report substitution 
(crowding-out) effects, and the remaining 6 report mixed/heterogeneous findings driven by 
differences in the sample or model chosen.  The majority of the studies that reported crowding-
out effects were based on US firm-level data. The reviewers conjecture that the relative lack of 
complementarity in the US data may be due to underlying differences between the US and 
continental European funding regimes.  
Later reviews also report mixed findings in the empirical literature. Drawing on a 
sample of 28 studies that utilize firm-level data, Garcia-Quevedo (2004) reports that 7 studies 
find additionality, 10 studies find no significant subsidy effects and 11 find crowding-out 
effects. Dimos and Pugh (2014) is a meta-analysis study based on 52 studies published from 
2000-March 2013. With respect to 300 effect-size estimates from 27 studies where 
additionality and crowding-out effects can be separated, they report that 164 effect-size 
estimates indicate additionality whilst 136 estimates indicate no effect (117) or crowding out 
(19). Overall, the balance of evidence remains ambiguous.  
However, recent studies that utilise matching tend to report higher incidence of 
additionality effects. For example, Hall and Maffioli (2008) report strong evidence of 
additionality in the case of technology development funds in Latin America. Similary, 
Czatrnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2012) report additionality effect in Flanders, using fourth 
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Community Innovation Survey (CIS4) data and matching methodology. Other studies 
reporting additionality effects include Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) and Hussinger (2008) 
on German firms; Duguet (2004) on French fimrs; and and Aerts and Schmidt (2008) on firms 
in Germany and Flanders.  
These recent studies indicate some clustering of additionality findings around mainly 
continental European countries. This clustering may indicate some data overlap and 
dependence between findings. On the other hand, it may also indicate that the funding regimes 
in these countries are more conducive towards additionality effects compared to other regimes. 
For example, the early review by David et al. (2000) indicates that R&D subsidies are less 
likely to be associated with additionality effects among US firms.   
 
 
3. Funding regime and data  
 
Business expenditure on research and development (BERD) in the UK is relatively low 
compared to other OECD countries, even after adjusting for inter-country structural 
differences. Another feature of the UK BERD landscape is that R&D activity tends to be 
concentrated in terms of size as well as technology classes (Hughes and Mina, 2012).  Direct 
and indirect public support for business R&D is around 0.16% of GDP and this is higher than 
most other OECD countries, excluding the US, Korea, Canada and France. Whilst the US relies 
more heavily on direct support, the UK government relies on both direct and indirect support 
with equal measures (National Audit office, 2013).  
Direct public support for business R&D includes funding from (or originating within) 
UK government departments, their agencies and non-departmental public bodies (e.g. 
8 
 
Technology Strategy Board or its successor, Innovate UK).2 Given the multiplicity of funding 
bodies and the change in the rules of the game over time, different selection criteria may have 
been used during our estimation period from 1998-2012. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify 
a range of common principles that have remained in place during this period.  
The R&D funding scheme in the UK has to comply with the State-Aid provisions of the 
European Union. Stated simply, the R&D grants should not unfairly advantage businesses in 
one country or unfairly prejudice businesses in other EU countries. This is usually ensured by 
grading the applications for funding on the basis of a proximity measure that indicate the 
proximity of the funded activity to the applicant’s market operations. According to this market 
readiness level (MRL) indicators, activities that score 1 – 2 are furthest away from the market. 
They consist of basic research and qualify for public funding of up to 100%. Activities with an 
MRL score of 3 – 6 are considered as R&D activities that are potentially conducive to product 
and process innovations but may not be undertaken optimally due to spill-over effects or market 
imperfections. These activities are usually supported through co-funding schemes; and 
constitute the largest chunk of both UK and EU R&D subsidies. 
Three important differences between the UK and EU regimes should be noted here. 
First, the R&D funding decisions of some of the agencies involved in UK funding (e.g., the 
regional development agencies – RDAs) may have been influenced by both innovation and 
local development objectives (e.g., job creation and regeneration), which may be incompatible. 
This is less likely in the EU scheme as regional development aid budget is separate from the 
budget for R&D (which falls within the Framework programs and the current Horizon 2020 
program). Secondly, the EU funding decision-makers can afford funding applications that are 
‘closer to market’ within the MRL scale of 3 – 6. This is because EU funding is usually given 
                                                          
2 The non-departmental public agencies also include eight regional development agencies (RDAs), which also 
provided R&D funding between 2000 and 2012 when they were discontinued.  
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to consortia consisting of multi-county applicants; and as such it is less likely to be constrained 
by the risk of State-Aid bias. Finally, and for from UK firm’s perspective, it is easier and less 
costly to apply for UK as opposed to EU funding. This is because applications to EU funding 
is usually through multi-country multi-agent consortia and the areas for funding are usually 
determined by the funder.  
Currently, the largest part of direct funding schemes in the UK are managed by Innovate 
UK - a public agency that reports to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 
but operates at arm's length from the UK Government. It provides funding for business-led 
projects with the objective of stimulating R&D and innovation activity, and encouraging the 
development of innovative products, processes and services with future commercial potential. 
All business entities (excluding research organisations, charities and public sector 
organisations) are eligible to apply for funding. Part-funding by the agency depends on firm 
size and type project, as indicated in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Funding rates as percentage of eligible project costs – Innovate UK 2014 
Applicant firm size Fundamental 
research 
Feasibility 
studies 
Industrial 
research 
Experimental 
development 
Micro (<10 employees) OR 
Small (<50 employees) 
100% 70% 60% 35% 
Medium (<250 employees) 100% 60% 60% 35% 
Large (250+ employees) 100% 50% 50% 25% 
Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/innovate-uk  
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Fundamental research is eligible for full project cost funding irrespective of the firm size. It 
is defined as “theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge … without any 
direct practical application or use in view.” For all other research types small and medium-
sized firms are eligible for somewhat higher funding rates - usually 10% more of the project 
cost compared to large firms.  Industrial research is funded at a rate of 60 and 50 percent of 
the project cost for SMEs and large firms, respectively. It is defined as “investigation aimed at 
the acquisition of new knowledge and skills for developing new products, processes or services 
or for bringing about a significant improvement in existing products, processes or services.” 
Experimental development research is funded at lower rates (25% - 35%) as it is closer to 
imitation rather than innovation. Given these rules, firms can apply for part-funding at or below 
the indicated rates. The agency decides on whether to fund and the amount of part funding, 
taking into account the project documentation and other information about the applicant. 
As far as eligibility and funding rules are concerned, the regime is transparent. 
However, Innovate UK does not publish information about how they set funding priorities - 
with the exception of references to policy documents published by BIS. In addition, the 
Business Research and Development Database (BERD) provides information on UK 
government funding received, but does not provide information on successful and unsuccessful 
applications. Another area where public information is lacking concerns implementation 
monitoring. There may be an accounting-based audit process, but we do not know how 
Innovate UK ensures that part-funding is spent in accordance with project objectives. Nor do 
we know if funding recipients are graded in terms of compliance with the conditions of the 
part-funding or on the basis of some performance indicators over the project life.   
In this study, we use data from BERD – a repeated annual survey designed to measure 
R&D expenditure and employment in UK businesses. Throughout the estimation period (1998-
2012), the BERD survey has been based on a random sample stratified by product group and 
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employment size-bands. The sample itself is drawn from a sampling frame that consists of all 
firms known to be R&D-active through information from HMRC R&D Tax credit claimants, 
other sources of administrative data, community innovation surveys (CIS) and responses to a 
survey question about R&D activity in the Annual Business Survey (ABS).  As of 2011, the 
sampling frame consisted of 25, 511 firms.  
The stratified sample consists of about 400 large firms that account for about 80% of 
UK business R&D expenditures (sampled 1:1); size-band2-firms (100-399 employees) 
sampled 1:5 and size-band3-firms (0-99 employees) sampled approximately at a rate of 1:20. 
The largest 400 firms receive a long survey form, with detailed questions on R&D types (e.g., 
total, intramural, extramural, current, capital, basic, applied R&D) and sources of funding (e.g., 
privately-funded R&D, and public R&D support received from the UK government and the 
European Commission separately). Other firms receive a short survey form with questions on 
total, intramural and extramural R&D only. Despite the difference between the question sets, 
BERD reports detailed breakdown of R&D types, employment of R&D personnel and other 
related data for all firms. Missing data for smaller firms is imputed from third-party sources or 
estimated by the Office of National Statistics (ONS). (See ONS, 2012).  
The elaboration on the funding regime and the data sources above indicates that the 
selection into UK and EU funding regimes is subject to both observable and unobservable 
factors. On the one hand, we can observe and verify the extent to which both UK and EU 
funding decisions are related to firm size, firm’s R&D capacity (e.g., R&D personnel and 
investment in R&D-related capital), industry characteristics, engagement in civil/defence 
R&D, etc. However, other criteria used in the funding decision are not observable in the data 
– e.g., project quality, MRL score, composition of applicants, etc. The implication is that the 
selection model for analysis should be suitable for taking into account the effect of both 
observable and unobservable factors (see below).   
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Table 2 above indicates the UK support intensity (direct UK government funding as percentage 
of total business R&D expenditures) is around 7%, with a range from about 10% in 1998 to 
7% in 2012. The table also indicates that UK support intensity during the crisis years of 2009-
2011 remained about 1.5 percentage points higher than the level in 2008. Finally, the number 
of firms in BERD has increased steadily over the years – from about 8.5 thousand in 1998 to 
22.2 thousand in 2012. The panel over the analysis period is unbalanced and consists of 44,497 
unique enterprises (firms). 
 
Table 2: Total R&D expenditures and UK subsidies: 1998-2012 (£ mn.) 
(Source BERD Database) 
Year 
Number of 
firms 
(enterprises) 
Total R&D 
(£ mn.) 
Central-
government-funded 
R&D (£ mn.) 
Support 
intensity 
(%) 
1998 8,350 10900 1049 9.62 
1999 7,678 11600 1133 9.77 
2000 8,630 11800 951 8.06 
2001 8,656 12200 743 6.09 
2002 10,930 12900 806 6.24 
2003 8,926 11900 976 8.20 
2004 11,752 14500 1312 9.05 
2005 12,969 15600 1125 7.21 
2006 16,849 16600 1042 6.28 
2007 19,911 18300 1040 5.68 
2008 16,970 19300 1040 5.39 
2009 19,046 18900 1289 6.82 
2010 18,592 19500 1383 7.09 
2011 20,556 20500 1488 7.26 
2012 22,169 20100 1338 6.66 
Total 44,497 2.35E+08 16715 7.12 
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Table 3 below presents the summary statistics.  The left panel report summary statistics on the 
basis of firm/year observations where the firm has received UK subsidy in a particular year; 
whereas the right panel correspond to firm/year observations when the firm is not a recipient 
of UK subsidy in a particular year. Stated differently, the left panel provides summary statistics 
on the basis of firm/year observation when the firm is treated; and the right panel provides 
summary statistics on the basis of firm/year observation when the firm is untreated.3  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics – 1998-2012 
(Firm/year observations) 
Treated (UK subsidy)       Untreated (No UK subsidy) 
 Observation Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
UK subsidy dummy 195,151 1.00 0.00 16,429 0.00 0.00 
EU subsidy dummy 195,151 0.80 0.40 16,429 0.14 0.35 
Privately funded R&D (£'000) 195,138 556.20 15424.28 16,405 6.59E+03 4.63E+04 
Total R&D (£ '000) 195,151 638.56 16457.67 16,429 6.59E+03 4.62E+04 
Privately funded R&D intensity 193,730 0.80 36.23 16,039 1.40 32.99 
Total R&D intensity 193,742 0.90 37.56 16,063 1.40 32.98 
Deflated private R&D  195,138 622.19 16848.80 16,405 7.36E+03 5.04E+04 
Deflated total R&D 195,138 715.22 18037.17 16,428 7357.57 50361.51 
UK central government support 
(£'000) 195,151 78.51 2945.44 16,429 0.00 0.00 
EU support (£ '000) 195,138 3.81 126.87 16,405 6.74 202.00 
UK subsidy intensity 195,151 0.07 0.09 13,051 0.00 0.00 
EU subsidy intensity 195,138 0.01 0.03 13,050 0.02 0.06 
Multiple subsidy dummy 195,151 0.80 0.40 16,429 0.00 0.00 
Turnover (£ '000) 195,150 2.70E+04 4.15E+05 16,429 1.44E+05 1.05E+06 
Deflated turnover (£'000) 195,016 2.88E+04 4.81E+05 16,422 1.69E+05 1.29E+06 
Deflated turnover growth 187,038 0.02 0.67 15,594 0.03 0.69 
Age 195,151 16.71 10.39 16,429 18.81 10.30 
Employment (count) 195,150 146.12 1884.73 16,429 648.83 4828.83 
UK ownership dummy 195,151 0.88 0.33 16,429 0.78 0.41 
Herfindahl index (3-digit) 195,150 0.10 0.11 16,429 0.13 0.14 
Herfindahl index squared 195,150 0.02 0.06 16,429 0.04 0.09 
       
Capital R&D intensity 193,742 0.04 2.03 16,063 0.09 5.18 
Capital R&D int. Sq. 193,742 4.12 1006.27 16,063 26.83 2860.29 
       
                                                          
3 Minimum and maximum values are excluded to comply with non-disclosure requirements of the data host. We 
do not provide a similar table for cases when EU subsidy is and is NOT received to save space.  
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R&D personnel (scientists and 
technicians) (count) 195,151 5.66 83.64 16,429 36.97 154.80 
Defence-related R&D activity 
dummy 195,151 0.59 0.49 16,429 0.24 0.42 
Pavitt class1 195,151 0.34 0.47 16,429 0.18 0.38 
Pavitt class2 195,151 0.22 0.42 16,429 0.11 0.31 
Pavitt class3 195,151 0.10 0.30 16,429 0.14 0.34 
Pavitt class4 195,151 0.28 0.45 16,429 0.43 0.50 
Pavitt class5 195,151 0.06 0.23 16,429 0.14 0.35 
Average effective real exchange 
rates 195,151 92.21 9.48 16,429 95.80 7.86 
Crisis dummy (=1 after 2007) 195,151 0.47 0.50 16,429 0.34 0.47 
Log (FTSE-100) 195,138 7.93 0.13 16,428 7.96 0.12 
 
 
 
 
The first observation to make is that the UK government support regime is highly generous: 
UK firms have received government support in 92% [(=195,151/(195,151+16,429)] of the 
firm/year observations. The average UK subsidy intensity is 0.07 (7%), with a 75th percentile 
value of 9% and a 95th-percentile value of 28%.  The third observation is that the R&D intensity 
of subsidy-receiving firm/year observations (0.8) is lower than that of non-subsidized year/firm 
observations (1.4). However, the mean conceals a high degree of skewness as the respective 
median values are 0.03 and 0.01.  
Table 3 also indicates that non-subsidized firms are usually larger and older; and have 
higher level of R&D investment in R&D-related capital such as lab equipment and buildings. 
Non-subsidized firm/year observations are also associated with higher levels R&D personnel 
on average. Finally, more than one-third (36%) of the R&D-active firms in the UK are in the 
science-based Pavitt technology class – Pavitt 1 that includes industries such as chemicals, 
information technology, office machinery, precision instruments, and medical and optical 
instruments industries.  
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4. Method 
 
We use this estimation sample and a structural model with selection to estimate the effects of 
both UK and European Union (EU) subsidies on privately-funded R&D investment.  
The first-generation structural models (Lichtenberg, 1987) build on a demand and 
supply framework compatible with profit maximization, but they treat the subsidy as 
exogenous. Even when they relax the assumption of exogenous subsidy, all they do is to use 
instrumental variable (IV) techniques such as two- or three-stage least-squares (2SLS, 3SLS) 
(Wallsten, 2000). The 3SLS estimator allows is preferable because it allows for correlation 
between the error terms of the selection and outcome equations. However, the exogeneity of 
the instrument for subsidy is non-testable even in the 3SLS setting because the model is just-
identified. Hence the 3SLS approach constitutes an improvement on the structural models, but 
it still does not address the issue subsidy endogeneity satisfactorily.  
Endogeneity of the subsidy may be due to three reasons. First, the decision of the 
funding agency to grant support and the level of subsidy granted may be dependent on the 
firm’s R&D effort. If the funding agency selects firms on perceived R&D effort, the OLS 
estimate for subsidy’s effect on R&D effort will be biased upward. Otherwise, the OLS 
estimate will be biased downward (Heckman, 1978; Wooldridge, 2002; Cerulli, 2010). 
Secondly, endogeneity may be due to ommitted variable bias that arises when the researcher 
does not have the necessary information about crucial variables (e.g., project quality) that affect 
the decision on subsidy and its level. Finally, the data may be subject to measurement error, 
leading to correlation between the error term and the regressors.  
The structural model with selection or the endogenous binary selection model we adopt 
here can address the issue of subsidy endogeneity satisfactorily, provided that the error terms 
of the selection and outcome models satisfy the condition of joint-normality. In what follows, 
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we draw on Busom (2000) and Takalo et al (2013) to specify the model and discuss the extent 
to which departures from joint normality may or may not be conducive to biased estimates.   
Let F* denotes the unobserved net profit of the firm, Z the vector of observable variables that 
determine net profit, and u the error term. Then the firm’s net profit function can be stated as 
follows: 
𝐹∗ = 𝑓(𝐙, 𝑢)         (1) 
Firm’s decision to apply for subsidy or abstain depends on F*. The firm decides to apply if 
profits net of application costs are positive. Otherwise it abstains - as stated below. 
𝐼𝑓 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐹∗ ≥ 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐹∗ < 0
        (2) 
The funding agency’s behaviour is modelled analogously, with G* denoting the objective 
function of the agency, W is the vector of observable factors that affect the agency decision, 
and v the error term.  
𝐺∗ = 𝑔(𝐖, 𝑢)         (3) 
The agency decides to grant or withhold subsidy after considering the firm’s application and 
evaluating the effects of granting the subsidy on its own objective function (G*).  The agency 
decides to grant subsidy if the decision ensures that G* ≥ 0; otherwise it withholds the subsidy.  
𝐼𝑔 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐺∗ ≥ 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐺∗ < 0
        (4) 
In the data, we do not observe the firm’s and the agency’s decisions separately. Instead, we 
observe the final outcome of granting or not granting of (hence obtaining and not obtaining) 
the subsidy. Denoting this outcome by I, we can write: 
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 𝐼 = 𝐼𝑓 . 𝐼𝑔 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐹∗ ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐺∗ ≥ 0
0                      𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
     (5a) 
 
Using the equivalents of F* and G* from (2) and (4), we can re-write (5a) as follows: 
𝐼 = 𝐼𝑓 . 𝐼𝑔 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 ℎ(𝐙,𝐖, 𝑢, 𝑣) ≥ 0
0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ(𝐙,𝐖, 𝑢, 𝑣) < 0
      (5b) 
Here h(.) is a function of observables in Z and W, and of the error terms u and v. 
Now let’s specify the firm’s behavioural equation with respect to investment in R&D (i.e., the 
R&D outcome equation) as follows: 
 
𝑅𝐷 =  𝜇 + 𝐗𝛼 + 𝛾𝐼 + 𝜀       (6) 
 
Here, RD is observed for two types of firms: (i) firms that participate in the public funding 
competition (when I = 1); and (ii) firms that do not participate in the funding competition (when 
I = 0). In this setting, the ‘non-participants’ constitute the comparator group that allows for 
estimating the effect of the treatment (R&D subsidy) on the treated (firms that have applied for 
and received R&D subsidy). Combining (5b) and (6), letting Q = [Z, W], and denoting firms 
with subscript i,  the system of equations for estimation becomes:  
 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑅𝐷𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝐗𝒊𝛼 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝐼𝑖
∗ =  𝜃 + 𝐐𝑖𝛽 + 𝑒𝑖
𝐼𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑖
∗ ≥ 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑖
∗ < 0
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖, 𝑒𝑖) =  𝜌 ≠ 0
       (7) 
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Compared with matching or OLS models that assume selection on observables, model (7) has 
the advantage of taking into account the effect of unobservables. This is done by assuming non-
zero correlation between the error terms of the outcome and selection equations – i.e., by 
assuming that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖, 𝑒𝑖) =  𝜌 ≠ 0.  
This assumption, however, is not sufficient for consistent estimation if some 
unobservables affect both the firm’s R&D effort and its treatment status (receipt or non-receipt 
of subsidy) simultaneously. This is the case because we condition the selection and outcome 
equations only on a set of observable covariates (X and Q). Reverting to IV techniques may be 
appropriate – but at the expense of not being able to test for exogeneity of the instrument for 
subsidy. This is the case unless we have more than one instrument – a condition rarely met 
given that it is already difficult to find even one valid instrument in this research filed.  
The good news is that the endogenous binary selection model provides a way out 
because it is a system of simultaneous nonlinear equations. The first is a ‘selection model’ for 
the public agency, estimated with a non-linear estimator (a probit estimator if the subsidy is 
observed as a binary outcome variable or a logit estimator if the subsidy is observed in levels). 
The second is an ‘outcome model’ estimated with OLS. Given this setting, the model remains 
formally identified thanks to its intrinsic nonlinearity.  
The endogenous binary selection model in (7) can be estimated via two-step or 
maximum likelihood (ML) procedures. Both procedures assume joint normality for the error 
terms of the outcome and selection equations (εi and ei). Under joint normality, both estimators 
are similar in terms of efficiency. However, the ML estimator is relatively less efficient if the 
dual normality condition is violated (Cerulli, 2010). Therefore, we use the two-step estimator. 
Once estimated, the model yields consistent estimates for the subsidy coefficient (𝛾).  
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In both models, the coefficient on subsidy (𝛾) is an indicator of the effect of public support on 
privately-funded R&D investments. However, it is not a precise estimate if the treatment is 
interacted with covariates in the outcome equation. To obtain the treatment effect when 
treatment is interacted with covariates in the outcome model, we need to take the expected 
value of the difference between the outcomes of treated and non-treated firms and the 
covariates with which the treatment variable is interacted. Denoting the R&D effort of the 
treated firms with RD1i and that of the non-treated firms with RD0i, and recalling that the R&D 
effort is a function of the covariates in vector X, we can write: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑅𝐷1𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷0𝑖) = 𝐸{𝐸(𝑅𝐷1𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷0𝑖|𝐱𝒊, 𝜺𝟎𝒊, 𝜺𝟏𝒊)} 
          = 𝐸{𝐱𝑖(𝛾𝑖 − 𝛾0)}        (8) 
 
The ATE in (8) is the average difference of the treatment potential outcomes and the control 
(non-treated) potential outcomes on the ‘whole’ population of both recipients and non-
recipients of the public support. 
On the other hand, ATET is the average difference of the treatment potential outcomes 
and the control potential outcomes on the treated population. It is estimated in accordance with 
(9) below. 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑅𝐷1𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷0𝑖 | 𝐼𝑖 = 1) = 𝐸{𝐸(𝑅𝐷1𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷0𝑖 | 𝐱𝒊, 𝐰, 𝐼𝑖 = 1)} 
             = 𝐸 {𝐱𝑖(𝛾𝑖 − 𝛾0) + (𝜌1𝜎1 − 𝜌0𝜎0)∅
(𝐰𝑖𝛽)
Φ(𝐰𝑖𝛽)
|  𝐼𝑖 = 1}   (9) 
 
Although the structural selection model (7) takes account of endogenous selection, it has two 
shortcomings. First, consistent estimation of the subsidy’s effect on R&D effort crucially 
depends on correct specification of the selection and outcome models. As indicated above, 
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usually we do not have sufficient information about the funding regime. Even if we do, there 
is no commonly-agreed set of covariates that should enter the behavioural equation for the 
funding agency. The second problem is due to time-constant firm effects that may be due to 
systematic differences between firms that are not observed/measured in the data. Such firm 
effects may be due to differences in management quality or other path-dependent 
characteristics – which remain constant over time for each firm but vary across firms. If time-
invariant effects exist and if they are correlated with the regressors, pooled OLS estimates from 
(7) will be biased. 
Wooldridge (1995) propose a conditional mean approach to correct for firm-specific 
effects in the selection and outcome models. The approach involves estimating inverse-Mills 
ratios for each year of the time dimension of the data. This involves estimating T probit 
selection models, where T is the number of years over which the firms are observed. The model 
can be specified as follows: 
 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + x′𝑖𝑡𝛼 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (outcome equation); and 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖 + z′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡       (selection equation) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜂𝑖 , x
′
𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0; 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝑖 , z
′
𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0      (10) 
 
𝜂𝑖 and 𝜃𝑖 are unobserved firm-specific effects. The firm-specific effect in the outcome equation 
(𝜂𝑖) can be eliminated by using a fixed-effect (within-group) estimator. However, the firm-
specific effect in the selection model (𝜃𝑖) cannot be eliminated with the same method because 
the selection model is non-linear and estimated with a probit estimator. Wooldridge (1995) 
draws on Chamberlain’s conditional mean theorem and demonstrates that the unobserved 𝜃𝑖 
can be substituted by inverse-Mills ratio for each firm/year observation by running T cross-
section probit estimations. Then the outcome model to be estimated boils down to: 
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𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + x′𝑖𝑡𝛼 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡    (11) 
 
Model (11) can be estimated consistently using a fixed-effect estimator. The coefficient on the 
intervention variable (𝛾) will be unbiased because its estimation takes account of the selection 
rule through inclusion of the inverse-Mills ratio and is carried out after eliminating the firm-
specific effects (𝜂𝑖). However, and just as it was the case with respect to the endogenous binary 
selection model, the consistency of the estimate for the subsidy effect depends on correct 
specification of the selection and outcome equations. Given that correct model specification is 
essential for consistent estimates, we use the same set of covariates for the selection and 
outcome equations in bot endogenous binary selection and conditional mean estimations. Then, 
the difference between the two can be interpreted as the bias that arises from failure to eliminate 
the firm-specific time-constant effects in the estimation of the endogenous binary selection 
model.  
Given these methodological considerations, we will provide estimates based on 
different estimators. This is to verify if the ‘treatment effect’ (i.e., the effect of subsidy receipt 
on privately-funded R&D) differs between estimators, depending on whether they control for 
endogeneity of the subsidy and eliminate the time-constant firm effects. The results will include 
OLS and fixed-effect estimates not corrected for selection bias, followed by structural selection 
model estimations from (7) and selection-corrected fixed-effect estimates from (11). Given that 
we have a panel dataset, our preferred estimator is Wooldridge’s fixed-effect estimator, which 
corrects for endogeneity of the subsidy and is carried out after eliminating the time-constant 
firm effects.  
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The estimations results will provide an indication of whether UK government or EU support 
has a complementary or substitution effect on firm’s private R&D intensity. Having established 
whether we observe a complementary or substitution effect, we will also check whether the 
effect of subsidy on R&D effort varies between firms with different levels of subsidy intensity. 
In other words, we will try to identify the class(es) of firms where subsidy intensity is more (or 
less) likely to leverage private R&D investment. This is an important issue given that the R&D 
intensity of UK firms has been and is still low in comparison to international standards (Hughes 
and Milna, 2012).  
To address this question, we use an ordered-probit selection model proposed by 
Chiburis and Lokshin (2007).  This model allows for sorting the firms into J+1 classes of 0, 1, 
2, … J on the basis of an ordered-probit selection rule where the latent selection variable (zi*) 
is not observable but the categorical variable (zi) is observable and depends on particular 
realisations of the latent variable. Then, we can specify the selection rule as follows (Chiburis 
and Lokshin, 2007): 
 
𝑧∗ = 𝛽′𝑤𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 ;    and 
𝑧𝑖 = 
{
 
 
 
 
0  𝑖𝑓 − ∞ < 𝑧𝑖 < 𝜇1
1  𝑖𝑓     𝜇1 < 𝑧𝑖 < 𝜇2
2  𝑖𝑓     𝜇2 < 𝑧𝑖 < 𝜇3
.                                   
.                                   
J  𝑖𝑓     𝜇𝐽 < 𝑧𝑖 < ∞
        (12a) 
 
The latent selection variable refers to subsidy intensity. In other words, we assume that firms 
belong to different classes of subsidy intensity as a result of a two-way selection process that 
we do not observe: selection by the firm to apply for subsidy and selection by the funding 
agency to award a given applicant. Given this setting, the outcome (R&D effort) is a linear 
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function of a set of covariates in xi and the coefficients (α0, … αj) vary between categorical 
classes of zi. Then, the R&D effort equation can be written as follows: 
 
𝑅𝐷𝑖 = 
{
 
 
 
 
𝛼′0x𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖0  𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖 = 0
𝛼′1x𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖1  𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖 = 1
𝛼′2x𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖2  𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖 = 2
.                                   
.                                   
𝛼′𝐽x𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝐽  𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖 = 𝐽
       (12b) 
 
Here the categorical variable zi = 0 is the class of firms that do not receive subsidy in a 
particular year; and the remaining classes 1, … J are sorted on the basis of increasing subsidy 
intensity. The latter is defined as the ratio of UK or EU public support to total R&D 
expenditures. The model in (12a) and (12b) can be estimated through a two-step procedure or 
via maximum likelihood (ML).  The necessary condition for consistent estimation of the model 
is the same as the selection model in (7) above: the error terms of the selection and outcome 
equations (ui and εi) must satisfy the condition of joint normality. The two-step procedure is 
more efficient than ML if normality condition is violated. Therefore, we estimate the model 
with a two-step consistent estimator.  
We define the subsidy intensity classes as follows: zi = 0 is the group consisting of 
firm/year observations when subsidy intensity is zero; zi = 1 is the group consisting of firm/year 
observations where subsidy intensity is greater than zero but less than or equal to the value at 
the 25th percentile; zi = 2 is the group consisting of firm/year observations where subsidy 
intensity is between the 25th percentile and median; zi = 3 is the group consisting of firm/year 
observations where subsidy intensity is between the median and the 75th percentile; and zi = 4 
is the group consisting of firm/year observations where subsidy intensity is greater than the 
value at the 75th percentile.  
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5. Findings 
 
Given the methodological framework above, the selection and outcome models we estimate 
are as follows: 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑏_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑅𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑙
2𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑅𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑅𝐷_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑙
2𝑅𝐷_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑙
2𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10def _𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡4𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(Selection equation) 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣_𝑅𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 +  𝛾𝑆𝑢𝑏_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡    𝛼1𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑙
2𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝑙
2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑙
2𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑢𝑘_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼9HI_sq𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼11𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡3𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼13𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼14𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼15𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼16𝑙𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼17𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼18𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒_𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Outcome equation) 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑏_𝑑𝑢𝑚 is the dependent variable in the selection model and it is 1 if the firm receives public 
support in a particular year. On the other hand, 𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣_𝑅𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡 is the dependent variable in 
the outcome model and it measures the intensity of privately-funded R&D expenditures as a 
ratios of turnover. The privately-funded R&D intensity is augmented with 1 before its 
logarithm is taken.  
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In the selection model, we assume that the funding agency selects applicants on the basis of 
certain firm characteristics, including a size dummy that depicts SMEs with less than 250 
employees (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑢𝑚); whether the firm is was born in 1998 or thereafter (startup_dum); 
intensity of R&D investment in research labs and equipment (𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑅𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡) and its square; 
number of R&D personnel (i.e., scientists and technicians) employed (𝑅𝐷_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠 ) and its 
square; firm age (age) and its square; number of employees (empl) and its square; growth rate 
of deflated turnover between year t-1 and t (growth); whether the firm is engaged in defence-
related R&D (def_RD); and the firm’s membership of Pavitt technology classes. A prefix (l) 
indicates that the variable is in logs, a prefix (l2) indicates squared value of the logged variable, 
and a subscript (t-1) indicates that the variable is lagged one year. The lagged value is used as 
we assume that the funding agency evaluates the firm on the basis of the latter’s annual 
statement (which provides information about the previous year). The squared values (the 
quadratic terms) are included to establish whether the funding agency’s selection decisions 
change at different levels of the firm characteristic in question.   
Covariates in the selection model are chosen on the basis of the information discussed 
in section 3 above. The discussion there draws on technology strategy documents published by 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), various funding 
schemes/competitions publicised on the Innovate UK website, interviews with Innovate UK 
staff; and from modelling work in the relevant literature.  
A similar approach has been adopted in specifying the outcome model. The level of 
deflated output (turnover) and its square is included because they can be considered as proxies 
for the cash flow available to the firm. In the R&D investment literature, cash flow is usually 
reported to be a significant determinant of R&D investment (Brown et al., 2009; Hall et al., 
1998). Age is also a frequently-cited determinant of R&D investment, with older firms reported 
to have lower innovation intensities (Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004; Balasubramanian and Lee, 
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2008). There is also a long-standing debate about whether firm size and innovation intensity 
are related (see, Cohen et al., 1987; Shefer and Frenkel, 2005; and Tsai and Wang, 2005). 
Concentration at 3-digit industry level is included in line with Schumpeterian models of 
competition and innovation (Aghion et al, 2005; Polder and Veldhuizen, 2012).  
Finally, we include dummies for Pavitt technology classes, treating the unclassified 
industries (Pavitt5) as the excluded category. Pavitt class 1 consists of firms in science-based 
industries (e.g., chemicals, office machinery, precision, medical and optical instruments 
industries, ICT, etc.). Pavitt class 2 consists of industries that are specialized suppliers of 
technology or capital goods to other industries (e.g., mechanical engineering industries, 
manufacturers of electrical machinery, equipment hire&lease industries, and business services 
suppliers, etc.). Pavitt class 3 consists of scale-intensive industries such as pulp&paper, 
transport vehicles, mineral oil refining industries, financial intermediaries, etc.). Pavitt class 4 
consists of technology-supplier-dominated industries such as textiles & clothing, food & drink, 
fabricated metals, etc.  
Table 4 below presents probit estimation results for the selection model. The exclusion 
restriction is ensured by using a size dummy that features in the selection of both UK 
government and the European union funding rule. This dummy is equal 1 if the firm is 
classified as small-to-medium-sized (SME) in both regimes; and zero otherwise. This dummy 
is not included in the outcome models. When checked in conjunction with other covariates in 
the outcome model, the size dummy is not correlated with the private R&D intensity, which is 
the dependent variable. Hence, we are satisfied that the size dummy complies with the 
necessary condition for exclusion restriction.  
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Table 4: Probit estimation of the selection model 
(Dependent variable: Subsidy dummy) 
Regressor Description/measurement UK Regime EU regime 
Size dummy =1 if firm employment < 250 0.116*** 0.0698*** 
  (0.0233) (0.0189) 
Start-up firm = 1 if new entrant 0.147*** -0.0866*** 
  (0.0144) (0.00923) 
Lagged Capital R&D int. Log (int. +1), lagged 1 year -0.379*** -0.224*** 
  (0.0815) (0.0657) 
Lagged Capital R&D int. sq. Log squared, lagged 1 year 0.0547** 0.0180 
  (0.0234) (0.0201) 
R&D personnel Log, lagged 1 year -0.126*** -0.106*** 
  (0.00445) (0.00337) 
R&D personel sq. Log squared, lagged 1 year -0.0452*** -0.0350*** 
  (0.000716) (0.000589) 
Growth Growth of deflated t/over 0.0176** 0.0144** 
  (0.00884) (0.00605) 
Employment Log, lagged 1 year -0.101*** -0.0229** 
  (0.0128) (0.00927) 
Employment sq. Log squared, lagged 1 year 0.0176*** 0.0133*** 
  (0.00151) (0.00120) 
Defense R&D active = 1 if firm engages in defense R&D 0.688*** 0.251*** 
  (0.0125) (0.00802) 
Pavitt class1 Science-based 0.671*** 1.784*** 
  (0.0246) (0.0177) 
Pavitt class2 Specialized supplier of tech. 0.598*** 1.278*** 
  (0.0252) (0.0167) 
Pavitt class3 Scale-intensive 0.233*** 0.841*** 
  (0.0244) (0.0177) 
Pavitt class4 Supplier-dominated 0.0245 0.168*** 
  (0.0211) (0.0153) 
Constant Constant 1.121*** -0.318*** 
  (0.0416) (0.0299) 
sigma  0.269 0.293 
Rho  0.827 0.796 
Lambda (sigma*Rho)  0.223*** 0.233*** 
  (0.00405) (0.00505) 
Observations  162733 162733 
Excluded category for Pavitt classes is class 5, which consists of un-classified industries 
 
 
Comparing the UK and EU regimes, we can see that in both regimes the probability of granting 
subsidies is higher if the firm is SME or it records stronger growth performance in the previous 
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year. The two regimes are also similar in their approach to size (employment headcount): the 
two agencies tend to favour smaller firms when the number employed is small to begin with, 
but this preference is reversed after a threshold of employment is exceeded.  
The third and fourth similarities provide some indication about whether the regimes are 
‘picking up winners’ or ‘aiding the poor’.  The probit results indicate that firms with higher 
levels of investment in R&D-related capital (labs, equipment, instruments, etc.) are less likely 
to receive UK or EU subsidies – albeit the probability of receiving UK subsidy begins to 
increase after a certain threshold is reached. In addition, the evidence also indicates that the 
probability of receiving subsidy decreases in both regimes as the number of R&D personnel 
employed increases. Indeed, the probability of receiving subsides falls at higher rates as the 
number of R&D personnel is beyond a certain threshold. These findings indicate that both the 
UK and EU regimes tend to ‘aid the poor’ rather than ‘pick up winners’. Stated differently, 
firms that can be expected to have higher levels of R&D expenditures due to their existing 
investment in R&D-related capital and/or employment of R&D personnel (scientists and 
technicians) are not favoured by either UK or EU funding regimes. 
Despite these similarities, the two regimes differ with respect to two firm- or industry-
specific factors. First, there is evident contrast between the UK regime where a start-up 
company is more likely to receive subsidy and the EU regime where such company is less 
likely to receive subsidy. Secondly, there is strong evidence that a firm is more likely to receive 
EU subsidy (compared to UK subsidy) if it is in Pavitt technology classes 1, 2 and 3. These 
are: firms in science-based technology class (class 1); firms specialised in the supply of 
technology to other industries (class 2); and scale-intensive firms (e.g. automotive,  
pulp&paper, mining, etc.) (class3). These differences indicate that firms are more likely to 
apply and receive EU subsidies if they are well-established and operate within certain 
technology classes where the capacity to plan and undertake long-term R&D projects is higher. 
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Table 5 presents the estimation results for the outcome equation, using four different 
estimators: (1) pooled OLS with no selection correction; (2) fixed-effects with no selection 
correction; (3) pooled OLS with correction for selection on observable and unobservables; and 
(4) fixed-effects with selection correction for observables and unobservables. The coefficient 
on the UK subsidy dummy is negative and significant in 3 out 4 estimations, indicating that 
firms substitute the subsidy for privately-funded R&D. However, we know that the first two 
results are biased since they do not take account of selection. The third does take account of 
selection and indicates a high level of crowding out. This is the result obtained by estimating 
the endogenous binary selection model in (7) above. The model corrects for selection bias, but 
the consistency of its estimates depends on correct specification of the selection and outcome 
models. In addition, the OLS estimation of the outcome model does not take account of firm-
specific effects that may be correlated with the covariates. Therefore, we prefer model (4), 
which controls for both selection and firm-specific fixed effects (Greene, 1995). The result 
form model 4 indicates that UK subsidy has no additionality effect on the intensity of privately-
funded R&D.  
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Table 5: Effect of UK subsidy on Private R&D intensity – full sample 
(Dependent variable: Log of Private R&D intensity)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UK subsidy dummy -0.0442*** -0.0133*** -0.462*** 0.00284 
 (0.00629) (0.00413) (0.00808) (0.00466) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.437*** -0.517*** -0.433*** -0.523*** 
 (0.00643) (0.00847) (0.00139) (0.00972) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0215*** 0.0254*** 0.0210*** 0.0256*** 
 (0.000388) (0.000603) (0.000104) (0.000691) 
Log(Age) 0.0115* 0.137*** -0.00142 0.178*** 
 (0.00698) (0.0123) (0.00667) (0.0225) 
Log2(Age) -0.00848*** -0.0234*** -0.00688*** -0.0247*** 
 (0.00138) (0.00282) (0.00130) (0.00469) 
Log(Employment) 0.381*** 0.242*** 0.405*** 0.251*** 
 (0.00770) (0.00800) (0.00182) (0.00878) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0357*** -0.0240*** -0.0393*** -0.0246*** 
 (0.000789) (0.000948) (0.000237) (0.00103) 
UK ownership dummy -0.0119*** 0.00620* -0.00541*** 0.00676* 
 (0.00383) (0.00328) (0.00194) (0.00355) 
Herfindahl index 0.0696*** -0.0269 0.0820*** 0.0267 
 (0.0217) (0.0174) (0.0157) (0.0190) 
Herfindahl index sq. -0.0733** 0.0111 -0.0810*** -0.0484* 
 (0.0363) (0.0240) (0.0244) (0.0259) 
Pavitt class1 0.113*** 0.0285 0.147*** 0.0483** 
 (0.00990) (0.0200) (0.00918) (0.0233) 
Pavitt class2 0.0340*** -0.00803 0.0739*** 0.00938 
 (0.00777) (0.0166) (0.00789) (0.0187) 
Pavitt class3 0.0538*** 0.00637 0.0749*** 0.0136 
 (0.00782) (0.0170) (0.00769) (0.0189) 
Pavitt class4 0.00853 -0.00180 0.0303*** 0.000856 
 (0.00690) (0.0156) (0.00726) (0.0172) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate -0.00316*** -0.00240*** -0.00306*** -0.00261*** 
 (0.000176) (0.000168) (0.000205) (0.000194) 
Crisis dummy -0.0222*** -0.0258*** -0.0138*** -0.0372*** 
 (0.00328) (0.00318) (0.00387) (0.00406) 
Log(FTSE-100)  -0.0506*** -0.0628*** -0.0385*** -0.0797*** 
 (0.00465) (0.00484) (0.00499) (0.00551) 
Multiple subsidy dummy -0.00254 0.00807*** -0.00382** 0.00380** 
 (0.00263) (0.00168) (0.00194) (0.00174) 
     
Inverse Mills - UK    0.0809*** 
    (0.00608) 
Constant 2.072*** 2.424*** 2.293*** 2.444*** 
 (0.0480) (0.0612) (0.0451) (0.0784) 
     
lambda   0.223**  
sigma   0.269 0.328 
rho   0.827 0.675 
Observation 209652 209652 162733 162733 
 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit industry dummies. Time 
dummies are not included as the crisis dummy, the FTSE-100 and the average effective exchange rates capture 
time variation. (1) and (2) are pooled OLS and Fixed-effect without selection correction; (3) is pooled OLS with 
selection correction; and  (4) is FE with selection correction. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 below replicates the same set of estimations for EU subsidy. For the same reasons 
indicated above, we prefer the estimate from model (4). In contrast to UK subsidies, EU 
subsidies have an additionality effect as the coefficient on EU subsidy is positive and 
significant. This result suggests that the UK selection regime can learn from EU experience in 
order to leverage more private R&D effort from supported firms. 
Table 6: Effect of EU R&D subsidy on Private R&D intensity – full sample 
(Dependent variable: Log of Private R&D intensity) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU subsidy dummy 0.0314** 0.0128** -0.370*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.0136) (0.00546) (0.0117) (0.00789) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.437*** -0.517*** -0.434*** -0.523*** 
 (0.00643) (0.00847) (0.00143) (0.00973) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0215*** 0.0254*** 0.0212*** 0.0256*** 
 (0.000387) (0.000603) (0.000106) (0.000693) 
Log(Age) 0.0119* 0.138*** 0.00433 0.204*** 
 (0.00700) (0.0123) (0.00673) (0.0225) 
Log2(Age) -0.00865*** -0.0240*** -0.00668*** -0.0344*** 
 (0.00139) (0.00279) (0.00131) (0.00460) 
Log(Employment) 0.381*** 0.242*** 0.404*** 0.249*** 
 (0.00767) (0.00799) (0.00193) (0.00877) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0356*** -0.0239*** -0.0385*** -0.0240*** 
 (0.000781) (0.000948) (0.000249) (0.00103) 
UK ownership dummy -0.0124*** 0.00626* -0.00599*** 0.00684* 
 (0.00388) (0.00328) (0.00196) (0.00357) 
Herfindahl index 0.0674*** -0.0273 0.0919*** 0.0289 
 (0.0216) (0.0175) (0.0157) (0.0191) 
Herfindahl index sq. -0.0705* 0.0119 -0.0916*** -0.0489* 
 (0.0360) (0.0240) (0.0243) (0.0260) 
Pavitt class1 0.111*** 0.0282 0.313*** 0.0478** 
 (0.00990) (0.0200) (0.0101) (0.0233) 
Pavitt class2 0.0320*** -0.00802 0.208*** 0.00917 
 (0.00773) (0.0166) (0.00858) (0.0184) 
Pavitt class3 0.0516*** 0.00632 0.182*** 0.0167 
 (0.00780) (0.0170) (0.00811) (0.0187) 
Pavitt class4 0.00644 -0.00165 0.0560*** 0.00390 
 (0.00687) (0.0156) (0.00726) (0.0169) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate -0.00290*** -0.00232*** -0.00244*** -0.00183*** 
 (0.000169) (0.000165) (0.000203) (0.000174) 
Crisis dummy -0.0197*** -0.0238*** -0.00701* -0.0171*** 
 (0.00323) (0.00300) (0.00388) (0.00341) 
Log(FTSE-100)  -0.0451*** -0.0609*** -0.0400*** -0.0609*** 
 (0.00457) (0.00474) (0.00501) (0.00531) 
Multiple subsidy dummy -0.0470*** -0.00728 -0.0450*** -0.0149* 
 (0.0137) (0.00536) (0.00762) (0.00767) 
Inverse Mills - EU    0.0138*** 
    (0.00253) 
Constant 1.971*** 2.391*** 1.989*** 2.223*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0594) (0.0443) (0.0747) 
lambda   0.233  
sigma  0.332 0.293 0.330 
rho  0.657 0.796 0.677 
N 209652 209652 162733 162733 
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NOTE: Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit industry dummies. Time 
dummies are not included as the crisis dummy, the FTSE-100 and the average effective exchange rates capture 
time variation. (1) and (2) are pooled OLS and Fixed-effect without selection correction; (3) is pooled OLS with 
selection correction; and  (4) is FE with selection correction. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix replicate the estimations in Tables 5 and 6, using data 
for firms in the manufacturing sector only.  Results from the preferred estimator (i.e., the 
fixed-effect estimator corrected for selection) also indicate an additionality effect in the 
case of EU subsidy (an effect of 1.92%). The results for manufacturing also indicate 
additionality in the case of UK subsidy too, but the effect (0.9%) is too small to be 
economically significant.  
These findings indicate that when a firm switches from a non-subsidised to a 
subsidised status, its privately-funded R&D intensity increases by 2% in the case of EU 
subsidy in the manufacturing sample or the full sample.  However UK subsidy has no 
effect in the full sample, and the additionality effect is less than 1% (0.9%) in the 
manufacturing sector. Overall, these findings indicate that the EU regime is more 
successful in leveraging additionality compared to the UK regime. 
We have also estimated an ordered-Heckman model (12a and 12b) with a view to 
identify the variation in the relationship between subsidy intensity and private R&D 
intensity. The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8 (for UK and EU subsidy intensity 
classes, respectively). The covariate of interest (UK or EU subsidy intensity) consists of 
four subsidy intensity classes, where each class corresponds to a quartile of the subsidy 
intensity distribution. The number in the column headings (1, 2, 3, 4) indicates 
estimations results for subsidy  intensity   classes that correspond to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 
4th quartiles of the subsidy intensity distribution. The coefficient on the subsidy intensity 
indicate the extent to which UK (or EU) funders can leverage private R&D additionality 
by increasing the subsidy within a particular subsidy intensity class.   
33 
 
 
Results in Table 7 below indicate that UK funders would be unable to leverage additional 
private R&D effort in any of the subsidy intensity classes. In fact, a 1% increase in UK 
subsidy intensity is associated with additional crowding-out effects of -1.732% in subsidy 
intensity class 2 and a crowding-out effect of -0.131% in intensity class 4. In contrast, an 
increase of 1% in EU subsidy intensity can leverage an additional private R&D intensity 
by 4.833% in subsidy intensity class 3. Nevertheless, an increase of 1% in EU subsidy 
intensity is associated with a high degree of crowding out (-18.46%) in subsidy intensity 
class 2. The results from both UK and EU subsidy intensity classes are consistent in the 
sense that subsidy intensity class 2 is the least likely class for leveraging additional R&D 
effort by increasing the generosity of the subsidy granted.  
 
Table 7: Ordered Heckman estimates for UK subsidy intensity classes: 
[Dependant variable: Log (Private R&D intensity + 1) 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
Log(UK subsidy intensity + 1) -0.328 -1.702*** -0.0335 -0.131*** 
 (0.553) (0.304) (0.0666) (0.0161) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.401*** -0.485*** -0.401*** -0.523*** 
 (0.00272) (0.00266) (0.00247) (0.00281) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0194*** 0.0253*** 0.0212*** 0.0272*** 
 (0.000194) (0.000210) (0.000191) (0.000251) 
Log(Age) -0.0228*** -0.0274*** -0.0288*** -0.0508*** 
 (0.00211) (0.00221) (0.00216) (0.00256) 
Log(Employment) 0.322*** 0.403*** 0.354*** 0.474*** 
 (0.00318) (0.00353) (0.00329) (0.00393) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0298*** -0.0418*** -0.0370*** -0.0479*** 
 (0.000386) (0.000463) (0.000437) (0.000554) 
UK ownership dummy -0.00646** 0.000542 -0.00111 0.00717 
 (0.00297) (0.00355) (0.00386) (0.00531) 
Herfindahl index -0.0619** -0.0300 0.0368 -0.0172 
 (0.0284) (0.0342) (0.0292) (0.0376) 
Herfindahl index sq. 0.124*** 0.0564 -0.0611 0.0399 
 (0.0452) (0.0565) (0.0455) (0.0642) 
Pavitt class1 0.130*** 0.106*** 0.0695*** 0.0388 
 (0.0159) (0.0201) (0.0244) (0.0513) 
Pavitt class2 0.0516*** 0.0243 0.0473*** 0.0255 
 (0.0159) (0.0178) (0.0122) (0.0214) 
Pavitt class3 0.0958*** 0.0281* 0.0517*** -0.00788 
 (0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0137) (0.0227) 
Pavitt class4 0.0507*** 0.0174 0.0454*** 0.0421** 
 (0.0139) (0.0160) (0.0130) (0.0171) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate -0.000771** -0.000489 -0.00254*** -0.0121*** 
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 (0.000339) (0.000689) (0.000546) (0.000548) 
Crisis dummy -0.0154*** -0.0253* -0.0335*** 0.0320*** 
 (0.00569) (0.0135) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Log(FTSE-100)  0.00565 0.0136 0.0606*** -0.110*** 
 (0.00819) (0.0107) (0.0116) (0.0132) 
Multiple subsidy dummy 0.00514 0.0142*** -0.0296*** 0.114*** 
 (0.00351) (0.00458) (0.00395) (0.00681) 
Constant 1.330*** 1.523*** 0.956*** 3.387*** 
 (0.132) (0.130) (0.0789) (0.119) 
lambda 0.0191*** 0.0273*** -0.00473 0.116*** 
 (0.00449) (0.00541) (0.00616) (0.00905) 
Observation 161829 161829 161829 161829 
 
Categorical class with 0 (zero) subsidy intensity is excluded. Class 1 is consists of firm/year observations 
where subsidy intensity is greater than zero but less than or equal to the value at the first quartile; Class 2 
refers to subsidy intensity between the first-quartile and median values; Class 3 refers to subsidy intensity 
between the median and third-quartile value; and Class 4 refers to subsidy intensity equal to or greater 
than the value at the third quartile.  
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Table 8: Ordered Heckman estimates for EU subsidy intensity classes: 
[Dependant variable: Log (Private R&D intensity + 1)] 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
Log (EU subsidy intensity + 1) -0.635 -18.46*** 4.833*** -0.736*** 
 (3.672) (1.925) (0.545) (0.0470) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.430*** -0.349*** -0.486*** -0.610*** 
 (0.00266) (0.00259) (0.00313) (0.00346) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0216*** 0.0175*** 0.0252*** 0.0321*** 
 (0.000190) (0.000194) (0.000253) (0.000342) 
Log(Age) -0.0240*** -0.0273*** -0.0421*** -0.0453*** 
 (0.00201) (0.00217) (0.00291) (0.00317) 
Log(Employment) 0.349*** 0.288*** 0.460*** 0.613*** 
 (0.00344) (0.00327) (0.00479) (0.00603) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0335*** -0.0279*** -0.0461*** -0.0615*** 
 (0.000397) (0.000413) (0.000604) (0.000786) 
UK ownership dummy -0.00428* -0.000629 0.00120 -0.0210*** 
 (0.00260) (0.00334) (0.00506) (0.00679) 
Herfindahl index -0.0362 0.0630** 0.588*** -0.292*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0302) (0.0447) (0.0433) 
Herfindahl index sq. 0.0790 -0.0471 -0.748*** 0.418*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0440) (0.0732) (0.0861) 
Pavitt class1 -0.0104 0.0369** -0.0539* 0.0795 
 (0.0272) (0.0171) (0.0292) (0.0822) 
Pavitt class2 -0.0445* 0.0333** -0.0697*** -0.00659 
 (0.0243) (0.0141) (0.0237) (0.0446) 
Pavitt class3 -0.0129 0.0463*** -0.00103 0.0270 
 (0.0235) (0.0153) (0.0236) (0.0437) 
Pavitt class4 0.0306 0.0726*** 0.0270 0.0244 
 (0.0233) (0.0160) (0.0212) (0.0306) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate -0.000873** 0.00257*** -0.00289*** -0.0249*** 
 (0.000361) (0.000491) (0.000540) (0.00158) 
Crisis dummy -0.0140* 0.0303*** 0.0358*** -0.214*** 
 (0.00741) (0.00867) (0.0107) (0.0316) 
Log(FTSE-100)  0.00699 -0.0542*** -0.0783*** -0.0669*** 
 (0.00843) (0.00884) (0.0156) (0.0152) 
Multiple subsidy dummy -0.0656*** -0.123*** -0.210*** -0.123*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0146) (0.0230) (0.0168) 
Constant 1.401*** 1.469*** 2.573*** 5.159*** 
 (0.0975) (0.0698) (0.135) (0.220) 
lambda -0.0960*** -0.0363*** -0.0969*** -0.0626*** 
 (0.00718) (0.00548) (0.0113) (0.0173) 
Observation 161829 161829 161829 161829 
 
So far, we have interpreted the results with respect to the relationship between subsidy and 
private R&D effort only. However, our estimation results indicate that private R&D intensity 
is also related to wide range of other firm-level, industry-level and macroeconomic variables. 
Results from the full sample and from the manufacturing sample depict a consistent picture 
with respect to the effects of these covariates. Whilst turnover (as a proxy for cash flow) has a 
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U-shaped relationship with R&D intensity; age and size (measured by employment headcount) 
and market concentration all have an inverted-U relationship. In the case of industry-level 
factors, we observe that private R&D intensity is consistently higher in Pavitt technology 
classes 1 – 3 compared to the excluded category of unclassified technology class. Finally, 
private R&D intensity is lower during the post-crisis period (2008-2012), when the currency 
experiences real appreciation, and the FTSE-100 index increases. (These findings and their 
relationships with the existing literature will be discussed later. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We have investigated the effects of UK and EU subsidies on privately-funded R&D intensity, 
using a sample of over 44 thousand UK firms. The sample consists of R&D-active firms 
surveyed in at least one year from 1998-2012. The results are obtained from 4 different 
estimators, with different degrees of control for selection and time-constant fixed effects: (i) 
pooled OLS without selection correction; (ii) fixed-effect (within-group) estimation without 
selection correction; (iii) pooled OLS with selection correction; and (iv) fixed-effect estimation 
with selection correction. We report that UK subsidies are not associated with additionality in 
privately -funded R&D intensity in the full sample, and the additionality effect in 
manufacturing is too small to be economically significant. In contrast, EU subsidy is associated 
with an additionality effect of 2% in both samples. Ordered-Heckman estimations of leverage 
indicate that an increase in UK subsidy intensity (subsidy/total R&D) is not likely to make a 
difference to private R&D effort in any of the subsidy intensity classes demarcated by 4 
quartiles of the subsidy intensity of the distribution. However, an increase in EU subsidy 
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intensity is associated with leverage in subsidy intensity class 3, which corresponds to intensity 
values within the 3rd quartile of the distribution.  
Estimation results also indicate that private R&D intensity is related to wide range of 
other firm-level, industry-level and macroeconomic variables. Results from the full sample and 
from the manufacturing sample depict a consistent picture with respect to the effects of these 
covariates. Whilst turnover (as a proxy for cash flow) has a U-shaped relationship with R&D 
intensity; age and size (measured by employment headcount) and market concentration all have 
an inverted-U relationship. In the case of industry-level factors, we observe that private R&D 
intensity is consistently higher in Pavitt technology classes 1 – 3 compared to the excluded 
category of unclassified technology class. Finally, private R&D intensity is lower during the 
post-crisis period (2008-2012), when the currency experiences real appreciation, and the FTSE-
100 index increases.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: UK subsidy and privately-funded R&D effort – Manufacturing. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UK_sub_dum -0.00339 0.00578** -0.171*** 0.00880*** 
 (0.00332) (0.00241) (0.00827) (0.00242) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.309*** -0.391*** -0.288*** -0.374*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0300) (0.00192) (0.0336) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0145*** 0.0176*** 0.0134*** 0.0168*** 
 (0.000920) (0.00173) (0.000125) (0.00196) 
Log(Age) -0.0604*** -0.0142 -0.0643*** -0.0187 
 (0.0152) (0.0321) (0.00823) (0.0467) 
Log2(Age) 0.00765*** 0.00648 0.00834*** 0.00913 
 (0.00262) (0.00610) (0.00149) (0.00887) 
Log(Employment) 0.231*** 0.154*** 0.226*** 0.154*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0133) (0.00213) (0.0152) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0201*** -0.0123*** -0.0200*** -0.0124*** 
 (0.00147) (0.00148) (0.000253) (0.00172) 
UK ownership dummy -0.00415* 0.0000595 -0.00318** 0.00178 
 (0.00239) (0.00250) (0.00147) (0.00236) 
Herfindahl index 0.0179 -0.0123 0.0136 -0.00981 
 (0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0160) (0.0196) 
Herfindahl index sq. -0.0253 0.00203 -0.00543 -0.00550 
 (0.0328) (0.0304) (0.0320) (0.0328) 
Pavitt class1 0.0844*** 0.0227 0.114*** -0.0115 
 (0.0127) (0.0269) (0.00974) (0.0185) 
Pavitt class2 0.0594*** 0.0152 0.0842*** -0.0106 
 (0.0114) (0.0249) (0.00935) (0.0148) 
Pavitt class3 0.0824*** 0.0277 0.100*** -0.00437 
 (0.0108) (0.0246) (0.00894) (0.0142) 
Pavitt class4 0.0321*** 0.0163 0.0519*** -0.00890 
 (0.00951) (0.0232) (0.00892) (0.0108) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate 0.000267 0.000420*** 0.000599*** -0.0000322 
 (0.000190) (0.000159) (0.000187) (0.000165) 
Crisis dummy 0.0144*** 0.00853*** 0.0191*** -0.00378 
 (0.00362) (0.00304) (0.00351) (0.00374) 
Log(FTSE-100)  -0.00449 -0.00547 -0.00368 -0.0112*** 
 (0.00447) (0.00407) (0.00422) (0.00424) 
Multiple subsidy dummy 0.00497** 0.00605*** 0.00648*** 0.00490*** 
 (0.00208) (0.00152) (0.00164) (0.00158) 
Inverse Mills - UK    0.0225*** 
    (0.00447) 
Constant 1.028*** 1.574*** 1.096*** 1.603*** 
 (0.0585) (0.113) (0.0376) (0.132) 
Observation 82628 82628 68091 68091 
lambda   0.0888  
sigma  0.221 0.147 0.204 
rho  0.744 0.605 0.739 
 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit industry dummies. Time 
dummies are not included as the crisis dummy, the FTSE-100 and the average effective exchange rates capture 
time variation. (1) and (2) are pooled OLS and Fixed-effect without selection correction; (3) is pooled OLS with 
selection correction; and  (4) is FE with selection correction. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A2: EU subsidy and privately-funded R&D effort – Manufacturing. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU subsidy dummy 0.0152* 0.0106 -0.0637*** 0.0192** 
 (0.00814) (0.00871) (0.00930) (0.00805) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.309*** -0.391*** -0.289*** -0.374*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0300) (0.00192) (0.0336) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0146*** 0.0176*** 0.0135*** 0.0167*** 
 (0.000920) (0.00173) (0.000126) (0.00195) 
Log(Age) -0.0603*** -0.0160 -0.0580*** -0.0101 
 (0.0152) (0.0320) (0.00821) (0.0461) 
Log2(Age) 0.00764*** 0.00711 0.00750*** 0.00636 
 (0.00262) (0.00608) (0.00148) (0.00861) 
Log(Employment) 0.232*** 0.154*** 0.225*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0133) (0.00214) (0.0152) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0201*** -0.0123*** -0.0197*** -0.0124*** 
 (0.00147) (0.00148) (0.000253) (0.00172) 
UK ownership dummy -0.00416* 0.000000540 -0.00302** 0.00168 
 (0.00239) (0.00250) (0.00148) (0.00237) 
Herfindahl index 0.0178 -0.0119 0.0193 -0.0103 
 (0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0161) (0.0197) 
Herfindahl index sq. -0.0251 0.00253 -0.0163 -0.00479 
 (0.0329) (0.0304) (0.0324) (0.0329) 
Pavitt class1 0.0844*** 0.0219 0.147*** -0.00450 
 (0.0127) (0.0268) (0.0104) (0.0184) 
Pavitt class2 0.0593*** 0.0144 0.121*** -0.00597 
 (0.0114) (0.0249) (0.0101) (0.0147) 
Pavitt class3 0.0824*** 0.0268 0.133*** 0.0000838 
 (0.0108) (0.0246) (0.00945) (0.0141) 
Pavitt class4 0.0320*** 0.0155 0.0752*** -0.00777 
 (0.00950) (0.0232) (0.00916) (0.0107) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate 0.000318* 0.000345** 0.000380** 0.00000880 
 (0.000184) (0.000156) (0.000186) (0.000153) 
Crisis dummy 0.0154*** 0.00662** 0.0142*** -0.00301 
 (0.00354) (0.00283) (0.00349) (0.00318) 
Log(FTSE-100)  -0.00430 -0.00660 -0.00318 -0.000953 
 (0.00447) (0.00402) (0.00422) (0.00446) 
Multiple subsidy dummy -0.0109 -0.00279 -0.0110 -0.0110 
 (0.00819) (0.00845) (0.00709) (0.00792) 
Inverse Mills - EU    0.0129*** 
    (0.00275) 
     
Constant 1.016*** 1.595*** 0.974*** 1.513*** 
 (0.0584) (0.113) (0.0368) (0.124) 
Observation 82628 82628 68091 68091 
lambda   0.0474  
sigma  0.220 0.143 0.204 
rho  0.744 0.330 0.740 
 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit industry dummies. Time 
dummies are not included as the crisis dummy, the FTSE-100 and the average effective exchange rates capture 
time variation. (1) and (2) are pooled OLS and Fixed-effect without selection correction; (3) is pooled OLS with 
selection correction; and  (4) is FE with selection correction. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
